The legality of nonprice vertical practices in the U.S. is determined by their likely competitive effects. An optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs, and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss. Because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous, optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs, which should be guided by empirical evidence. Empirically, vertical restraints appear to reduce price and/or increase output. Thus, absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint's effect, an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive.
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's 1977 Sylvania decision was a watershed. 2 Faced with an exclusive territory agreement that would have been found illegal per se under existing precedent, the Supreme Court eschewed its prior "formalistic line drawing," and instead based its decision on demonstrable economic effects. 3 Since Sylvania, a successful antitrust plaintiff in U.S. courts must show that a challenged vertical restraint is likely to harm consumer welfare.
4
A similar movement away from form-based competition analysis of vertical restraints is occurring in the European Union. In 1999 and 2000, the Commission issued a new Block Exemption Regulation (BER) and accompanying guidelines that focus on the competitive effects of vertical restraints entered into by "non-dominant" firms under Article 81. 5 This new policy establishes a safe harbor for firms with market shares less than 30 percent. Vertical agreements entered into by firms exceeding this threshold (but below the 50 percent level required for "dominance") are judged by their overall competitive effect, including an accounting of efficiencies. 6 Complementing the law's focus on economics is the creation of the position of Chief Competition Economist, to promote the use of economic analysis in EC competition policy. 7 To assess the competitive effects of a vertical restraint, one must compare the world with the restraint -which is observed -to the world without the restraint, which typically is not. In general, it is possible to draw inferences about the unobserved state of the world in either of two ways. If a "natural experiment" mimics the effect of the restraint, one can compare a "control group" (without the restraint) to an "experimental group" (with the restraint) to gauge the effect of the practice. Provided one can hold constant other factors that might affect price, output, or other relevant variables, one can estimate the competitive effects of the restraint.
Absent a good natural experiment, one must instead use an economic model of the restraint to help assess its competitive impact; i.e., the analyst must posit a theory under which the restraint can harm competition, against alternatives where the restraint is benign or procompetitive, and then determine which theory best explains the evidence. In this paper we discuss this approach with reference to the theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of vertical control. 8 We view antitrust policy as a problem of drawing inferences from evidence and making enforcement decisions based on these inferences. In stylized terms, suppose that a given vertical practice can be either procompetitive (denoted "C") or anticompetitive (denoted "A"), and let x be evidence observed by the decision-maker and correlated with the competitive effects of the 6 See EU Vertical Guidelines at ¶ 116. practice; for example, primary market power, foreclosure levels, the nature of contracts, the shape of cost and demand functions, etc. Given the evidence x, assume that the decision-maker can either stop the practice or allow it to continue. Using Bayes' rule, we can write the policy maker's belief about the relative odds that a given practice is anticompetitive as a function of his prior beliefs about the practice, and the relative likelihood that the evidence observed would be produced by anticompetitive conduct:
(1) (
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In the remainder of the paper we use this simple heuristic to examine the antitrust treatment of vertical integration and restraints. Turning first to the likelihood, the task is how to interpret evidence gathered in an investigation in light of economic theory. Section II discusses three classes of theories of harm from vertical practices, focusing on practical implications for competition policy. The theory shows that vertical practices potentially can harm competition.
This finding is fragile, however, as anticompetitive equilibria emerge only under specific -and difficult to verify -assumptions about (among other things) costs, demand, the nature of input contracts, conditions of entry, the slope of reaction functions, and the information available to firms. Seemingly minor perturbations to these assumptions can reverse the predicted welfare effects of the practice in question.
9
A major difficulty in relying principally on theory to guide vertical enforcement policy is that the conditions necessary for vertical restraints to harm welfare generally are the same conditions under which the practices increase consumer welfare. For example, pre-existing market power in the primary market typically is necessary for vertical integration to raise price to 9 Of course, if one could establish which assumptions are appropriate ---i.e., which assumptions yield predictions consistent with the evidence and which do not ---then one could select and apply the appropriate theory. Our point is that this is extremely difficult to do in most cases. unintegrated rivals; but vertical integration under these conditions normally also would eliminate double-markup distortions, a procompetitive effect. Without informative likelihoods, the evidence in a particular case usually leads only to a small revision in prior beliefs about the likelihood that a vertical practice is, on balance, pro-or anti-competitive.
As is seen from (1), with an uninformative likelihood, our posterior beliefs about a given vertical practice will be very close to our prior beliefs about vertical practices generally. In
Section III we review a sample of the empirical literature on vertical practices to inform our priors about the practices. In most of the empirical studies reviewed, vertical practices are found to have significant pro-competitive effects.
Section IV discusses the implications of these findings for competition policy toward vertical practices. Continuing with the Bayesian framework, we derive a rule that classifies evidence as either being produced by an anticompetitive or procompetitive vertical practice depending on error costs, prior beliefs, and the likelihood. Prior beliefs and the likelihood may vary according to the restraint at issue and the pro-and anticompetitive theories posited.
Although empirical evidence on vertical practices is limited, the current state of this evidence supports a prior that vertical practices are likely to be efficient. In our framework, there are two ways that this prior belief can be overturned: evidence that the restraint harms competition in a particular application (an informative likelihood), and/or a belief that type-II errors are much more costly than type-I errors.
In an individual case, we would be convinced that a particular practice is anticompetitive by direct evidence (e.g., from a natural experiment) that a practice has had anticompetitive effects. The relative losses from type-I and type-II errors are empirical issues that have not been addressed systematically in the literature. In principle, the relative losses might depend on the particular practice and market characteristics. Such differences have at least the potential to explain differences in policy toward vertical practices in different jurisdictions.
II. Theories of Harm from Vertical Practices
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A. Softening Horizontal Competition
Raising Rivals' Costs
The possibility that firms could profit from raising rivals' (and potentially their own) costs constitutes much of the basis for challenging the "Chicago School" view that vertical restraints seldom harm competition. 11 For example, Scheffman (1983, 1987) point out that vertical integration or restraints sometimes provide ways for firms to raise their rivals' costs and thereby profitably reduce market output. Salop and Sheffman (1987) consider a dominant firm that controls a parameter (α) that affects the costs of the dominant firm and a competitive fringe, possibly in different ways. In one special case, they interpret α as an input price controlled by the dominant firm by varying its input purchases. In this case, the dominant firm can raise input costs (both its own and its rivals') by "over-purchasing inputs," through either excessive purchases of inputs on the open market or excessive purchases of productive capacity through vertical integration.
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Salop and Scheffman show that over-purchasing inputs may be profitable, and may reduce partial equilibrium welfare, depending on cost and demand parameters and the costraising technology. However, there is no general incentive to raise rivals' costs, and even when it is privately profitable to do so, the attendant welfare consequences may be positive. 13 If the 10 In limited space our discussion does not come close to a thorough survey.
11 In this paper we focus on the case of fixed proportions technology, which formed the basis for most of the "Chicago view" that vertical integration and restraints are benign or efficient.
12 A substitute for vertical integration in this context may be the cartelization of the upstream market. For example, Granitz and Klein (1996) argue that Standard Oil raised rival refiners' costs by cartelizing the oil transportation market (the railroads) and conspiring with them to charge rival refiners higher prices for transportation services.
13 A cost raising strategy is profitable if it raises the dominant firm's residual demand curve by more than its average cost curve. This generally depends on the cost and demand parameters and the cost-raising technology.
cost raising strategy is profitable, it may lead to an increase or decrease in price. This is because the dominant firm may expand output enough to offset the contraction in the output of the fringe.
If the strategy leads to an increase in price, total welfare still may rise if the dominant firm is more efficient than the fringe firms, as the shift in output from the fringe to the dominant firm can increase productive efficiency.
Game Theoretic Formulations
The use of vertical integration or restraints to soften competition has been extended to oligopoly environments using tools from game theory. Salinger (1988) Reiffen and Vita (1995) examine the case of N Cournot oligopolists in the upstream market and differentiated Bertrand duopoly in the 14 The "double markup" problem arises when producers with market power at adjacent stages of production (or more generally, producers of complements) set prices independently. The resulting prices are too high, and the corresponding outputs too low, to maximize joint profits. Eliminating this double markup through contract or integration not only increases the producers' profits, but, by increasing output, increases consumer welfare as well. This argument traces all the way back to Cournot (1838) , and was first articulated in the context of antitrust policy toward vertical mergers by Spengler (1950) .
15 Ordover et al. (1990) Reiffen (1992) and Hart and Tirole (1990) .
downstream market. Under linear demand, constant marginal cost, and symmetry, they find that a vertical merger: 1) decreases the final price of the integrating firm, 2) may increase or decrease the cost (input price) and/or the final price of the unintegrated rival, and 3) always increases consumer surplus. In this model, the downward pressure on final prices from eliminating the double mark-up more than offsets the effects of higher prices (when they arise) to unintegrated rivals. In this model, vertical integration is unambiguously good for consumers.
The tradeoff from vertical integration in the Salinger and Reiffen/Vita models is typical whenever upstream margins are positive, which is the normal case in imperfectly competitive markets. The use of nonlinear contracts can mitigate double-marginalization, but they do not necessarily eliminate it. One reason is that the mark-ups in nonlinear contracts can be used strategically by rivals to influence the competition between them. The literature on "strategic agency" (e.g., Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) , Bonanno and Vickers (1988)) compares the profitability and price effects of vertical integration versus "vertical separation"
(purchasing from an independent supplier) when firms can write observable two-part tariff contracts. Bonanno and Vickers, for example, consider the case of differentiated Bertrand competition. For this case, vertical separation typically is more profitable and leads to higher prices than vertical integration. 16 The idea is that separated firms can write observable two part tariffs with wholesale prices above marginal cost that "soften competition," whereas integrated firms transfer the input internally at cost. secretly. If secret renegotiations are feasible, the "softer competition" equilibrium unravels.
The strategic agency models that study vertical separation (with observable contracts)
focus on situations in which each vertically separated firm deals with only one firm in the other (upstream or downstream) market. That is, there is no input market competition. This assumption is important. For example, if each of the differentiated products in Bonanno and Vickers is competitively supplied, then the strategic effects of vertical separation disappear. The reason is that downstream competition makes it unprofitable for rivals to raise price in response to an increase in the cost of any particular firm. So the commitment by any one firm to a higher wholesale price has no value.
Vertically separated firms may deal with a single supplier or buyer due to exclusive contracts. Using the implications of the strategic agency literature, it is a short step from this observation to see that exclusive territory contracts may have the effect of softening competition.
In particular, exclusive contracts can effectively transform a situation with a competitive 17 As Katz (1991) points out, this assumes that two-part tariffs "solve" the agency problem between upstream and downstream firms. He shows that unobservable contracts may still have some commitment value when the agency problem between the upstream (principal) and downstream (agent) firms does not have a first-best solution.
downstream market, where upstream competitors cannot use two-part tariffs to soften competition, into a game of strategic agency in which two-part tariff contracts can be used for this purpose. This is the source of the anticompetitive effect of exclusive territories in the twopart tariff variant of the model in Rey and Stiglitz (1995) . As with vertical separation, this effect is fragile. In particular, the result disappears if wholesale prices are unobservable to rivals; and the restraints' competitive effects depend on the form of competition (e.g., Cournot or Bertrand).
A number of papers have appeared that employ the two-stage framework that originated in models of strategic agency to examine the effects of vertical integration and restraints in a variety of environments. We will not attempt to survey this literature further, but simply note some consistent themes that emerge. First, under linear input pricing, vertical practices typically affect the double-marginalization externality, sometimes making it worse 18 and sometimes mitigating it. 19 Firms must be aware of this effect when evaluating the profitability of strategies designed to soften competition. Second, the results often depend on the ability of rivals to observe wholesale prices; this observability allows firms to make credible commitments through their contracts. Third, the predictions of these models often depend on the nature of the oligopoly model employed.
20 20 There a another class of models that identify the possibility of "foreclosure" deriving from "multilateral opportunism." See Rey and Tirole (2003) for a survey of the relevant literature. By "multilateral opportunism" we mean joint decisions by an upstream and downstream firm that adversely affect the profits of rival downstream firms. (We note that mitigation of bilateral opportunism often is an important procompetitive motive for vertical mergers (see, e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) ; Klein (1978); Joskow (1985) ). We do not believe that the models described by Rey and Tirole provide a basis for antitrust enforcement. Antitrust policy towards monopolies and dominant firms should be directed against conduct that the monopolist uses to preserve or extend its monopoly. An upstream firm's use of vertical integration or restraints to mitigate opportunism has nothing to do with protecting itself from horizontal competition (as conventionally defined), or with extending or entrenching this market power.
C. Dynamic Effects
The theories discussed above are static, in the sense that they do not consider the effects of vertical practices on entry, exit, or long-run investment incentives. A third general class of theories of harm from vertical practices addresses these dynamic effects. This literature has focused mainly on the competitive effects of tying/bundling 21 and exclusive dealing.
22 Whinston (1990) was the first to examine rigorously the potential entry deterring effects
of tying. His model shows that a commitment to tying can cause a firm to price more aggressively against oligopoly rivals in the tied good market. If there are economies of scale in production in this market, this commitment can deter entry into production of the tied good because the potential entrant realizes that competition will be too vigorous for it to earn enough to cover its average costs. Carlton and Waldman (2002) show how a monopolist can use tying to preserve its monopoly in future periods or extend it into newly emergent markets. Nalebuff (2004) shows that a company with market power in two products that can bundle them together can make it harder for a rival selling only one of the products to compete.
The welfare effects of tying and bundling in these models are theoretically ambiguous, for a variety of reasons. In Whinston's model, for example, the commitment to compete more Instead, vertical integration helps the firm avoid opportunism so that it can exercise (potentially legitimately acquired) existing market power. Under the theory, the upstream firm will have incentives to use vertical practices even if there is no scope for altering competition at the upstream level. In this sense, the use of vertical restraints for this purpose is analogous to price discrimination by an incumbent monopolist -it allows the monopolist to capture a larger share of the social value created by its product, often increasing social welfare in the process.
aggressively caused by tying can also lower price. In addition, the welfare effects of entry into the tied good market are typically ambiguous because of the usual tradeoff between greater product variety and the fixed costs of entry. Whinston summarizes the welfare and policy implications of his analysis as follows:
While the analysis vindicates the leverage hypothesis on a positive level, the normative implications are less clear. Even in the simple models considered here, which ignore a number of other possible motivations for the practice, the impact of this exclusion on welfare is uncertain. This fact, combined with the difficulty of sorting out the leveragedbased instances of tying with other cases, makes the specification of a practical legal standard extremely difficult. (Whinston, 1990, p. 855-856) Carlton and Waldman also express caution in using their analysis to condemn tying. In the working paper version of their paper, they discuss the antitrust implications of their analysis:
It would be a grievous mistake to condemn such strategic behavior and attempt to use the antitrust laws to condemn it without an analysis of the welfare consequences of such behavior and without an analysis of the likelihood of being able to correctly identify such behavior without simultaneously condemning welfare enhancing behavior. Too often in the past, antitrust advocates have confused the theoretical possibility of harm with an empirical demonstration of such a harm. (Carlton & Waldman, 1998, p. 37) We agree with Whinston and Carlton & Waldman about the hazards of using these models to justify antitrust hostility towards these practices. 23 In particular, we think it is essential when attempting to apply these models to evaluate the welfare consequence of the practice. As a stark illustration of this point, we note that Nalebuff's (2004) bundling article often arises in policy discussions as a possible justification for antitrust hostility toward bundling. However, bundling in his model typically lowers prices and increases welfare.
Many models of vertical practices find that competitors are excluded precisely because the practices in question intensify competition. Antitrust policymakers tempted to draw policy 23 See also Evans et al. (2004) for a discussion of the problems associated with applying per se or badly designed rule of reason analyses to tying cases.
inferences from these analyses always must bear in mind that harm to competitors (e.g., harm to the non-bundling firms in Nalebuff) is not the same as harm to competition. Instead, harm to competitors is often -indeed, usually -consistent with enhanced competition. We normally would not condemn firms for making cost-reducing investments that induce more aggressive price competition, even if this competition harms competitors. Why, then, challenge tying or bundling arrangements having similar effects?
Evaluating the welfare consequences of tying is difficult in part because tying has several potential benefits (price discrimination, quality enhancement, lower transaction costs, etc.)
Carlton and Waldman make a distinction between "physical tying," where products are tied by physical attributes like compatibility, and "contractual tying," where products are tied by contract. Noting the difficulty of using cost-benefit analysis to identify harmful tie-ins, they conclude that, "other than in exceptional cases, plausible efficiency justifications for a physical tie should defeat an antitrust attack on tying." 24 They suggest that the standard for contractual tying might be lower with the balancing of costs versus benefits done as it is now done in exclusive dealing cases in the U.S.
Similar to the dynamic effects of tying and bundling, the dynamic effects of exclusive dealing arise from denying rivals sufficient scale to be profitable. We agree that this is the biggest source of anticompetitive risk from these practices. However, conducting a welfare analysis of exclusive dealing is also extremely difficult. Rasmusen et al. (1991) , Bernheim and Whinston (1998), and Winston and Segal (2000) , among others, show that exclusive dealing (ED) potentially can deter entry by preventing entrants from achieving minimum viable scale. Like most of the literature on vertical restraints, 24 Carlton and Waldman (1998), p. 39.
the exclusive dealing models are highly stylized. For example, these articles assume that downstream markets are served by local monopolists, and that the scale economies in the upstream market take a particular form. Even in these simple settings, the welfare effects of exclusive dealing are theoretically ambiguous. 25 For more realistic settings, e.g., with
downstream oligopoly, and general assumptions about the degree of scale economies, the theory has not been fully worked out.
III. Empirical Evidence on the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration and Control
In Table 1 we summarize existing empirical studies of vertical integration and vertical restraints. In carrying out this survey, we limit our review to those papers that address issues of explicit antitrust policy interest.
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In reviewing this literature, two features immediately stand out: First, there is a paucity of support for the proposition that vertical restraints/vertical integration are likely to harm consumers. Of all the studies cited in Table 1 , only one (Ford & Jackson 1997 , a study of vertical integration between cable television franchises and cable programmers) purports to find unambiguously an instance where vertical integration was harmful to consumers. And in this 25 Mathewson and Winter (1987) examine the case of two firms selling through a downstream monopolist using linear prices. Abstracting from economies of scale, show that the effect of ED on prices is ambiguous. For parameters in which ED is profitable, it may lead to more aggressive bidding for the right to be the exclusive supplier and thus a lower input price. This is a potential benefit of ED that must be weighed against possible entry deterrent effects. O'Brien and Shaffer (1997) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998) consider the case of nonlinear contracts (but retain the downstream monopoly assumption). Bernheim and Whinston show that ED can potentially deter entry and thereby reduce competition in "non-coincident" markets, i.e., markets other than those in which exclusive dealing is used. Exclusive dealing is costly in the markets in which it is imposed because it induces more aggressive bidding by manufacturers for the right to be exclusive (O'Brien and Shaffer, 1997) . However, the benefit of less competition in non-coincident markets may outweigh this cost. The welfare effects of ED in these models are ambiguous. Among other difficulties, equilibria exist in which only one firm serves the market even without exclusive dealing (O'Brien and Shaffer, 1997), so entry deterrence can occur given the right scale conditions even if ED is not used (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998) . 26 We do not discuss the extensive literature on contract choice in franchise relationships (see LaFontaine & Slade, 1997) , nor do we discuss the literature (with one exception) that examines optimal contract/integration choice in the face of asset specificity (see, e.g., Joskow 1985) .
instance, the losses are minuscule ($0.60 per cable subscriber per year). 27 Second, a far greater number of studies found that the use of vertical restraints in the particular context studied improved welfare unambiguously (i.e., resulted in lower prices and larger quantities).
More specifically, the studies in Table 1 appear to provide strong support for the proposition that vertical integration/vertical restraints often help solve double markup problems, and/or reduce costs in other ways. These studies include:
• U.S. gasoline (petrol) markets [Vita (2000) ; Barron & Umbeck (1984 & 1985 ; and Shepard (1993) found that retail prices were lower when vertical integration was permitted];
• Retail beer sales through pubs in the UK [Slade (1998a) found that the "beer orders" reducing vertical control of pubs resulted in higher retail beer prices];
• Cable television [Chipty (2001) found that integration of cable TV programmers with distributors lowered retail prices];
• Fast food [Graddy (1997) found that prices are higher in franchised fast food restaurants as compared with company-owned stores].
Other studies bearing on the double-markup or other cost savings issues analyze the competitive effects of vertical restraints in a broader cross-section of industries. For example, in her study of litigated RPM cases, Ippolito (1991) found that 30% of litigated resale price maintenance cases involved maximum RPM, strongly suggesting that in these instances vertical restraints were used as a means for constraining downstream market power.
The literature summarized in Table 1 also provides at least indirect evidence that vertical restraints sometimes are used to induce the provision of demand-increasing activities by retailers. 28 Ippolito (1991) and Ippolito & Overstreet (1996) found that in their samples, the use of RPM generally was consistent with demand-increasing activities by retailers. Also consistent with this rationale for vertical restraints are Sass & Saurman's (1996) findings that the ban on exclusive territories in beer sales reduced beer consumption by 6%. Mullin & Mullin (1997) found vertical integration induced investment in relationship-specific assets in steel production; Hersch (1994) also concluded that his stock market event study provided evidence consistent with the efficiency rationale for RPM. Heide, Dutta, & Bergen's (1998) study of exclusive dealing contracts found that a key determinant of the use of exclusive dealing contracts was whether manufacturer compensated dealers for services potentially "free ridable" by rival manufacturers. Notably, Heide et al. found also that the perception by managers that entry was likely reduced the probability that exclusive dealing contracts would be used, thus casting doubt upon the empirical importance of exclusionary motives for vertical restraints among the firms in their sample.
A few studies obtained results consistent with both pro-and anticompetitive characterizations of vertical restraints. Gilligan's event study (1986) obtained negative abnormal returns upstream when RPM contracts were challenged, a result consistent with efficiency and manufacturer collusion explanations for RPM (because manufacturer profits would be expected to fall under either of these possibilities). In their study of cable television, Waterman and Weiss (1996) found that cable systems that owned pay movie channels were less likely to carry rival pay channels, a finding consistent both with pro-and anticompetitive behavior (a decision to integrate vertically into programming is presumptively profitable; the profits could arise either from greater efficiency (elimination of double markups) or from foreclosure of some sort). Last, about the product, and then proceeds to purchase the product from a no-frills discount retailer (this motive for vertical restraints was first articulated by Telser (1960) . Vertical restraints (such as minimum RPM) can be used to prevent this free-riding. More generally, vertical restraints can be used to provide incentives for the provision of any non-contractable service that enhances demand with or without service externalities among retailers (Mathewson & Winter, 1984) . Hastings (2004) found that retail petrol prices increased when "unbranded" stations were acquired by branded refiner. However, she concludes that the change in price at newly-acquired stations is attributable to the effects of "branding" formerly "unbranded" retailers, not to greater vertical control by refiners; indeed, she notes explicitly that her empirical evidence does not support "divorcement" restrictions (i.e., proscriptions on the vertical control of gasoline retailers by refiners).
Overall, we would characterize the empirical literature on vertical restraints/vertical integration as follows:
• Most studies find evidence that vertical restraints/vertical integration are procompetitive;
• This efficiency often is plausibly attributable to the elimination of doublemarkups or other cost savings;
• A number of studies also find evidence consistent with "dealer services" efficiencies;
• Instances where vertical controls were unambiguously anticompetitive are difficult to find.
IV. Discussion
In this section we apply our review of the literature on vertical restraints to our Bayesian decision framework. We first summarize what we believe our review of the relevant literature says about the likely competitive effects of various vertical contracting practices:
• Most models that predict (potential) harm from vertical restraints require pre-existing market power at multiple stages of production. This condition usually implies the existence of efficiencies from vertical control, and the magnitude of the efficiency often rises monotonically with the level of pre-existing market power. The models that fail to find such efficiencies do so by invoking assumptions that are empirically unrealistic and hard to verify.
• Even when the only merger-related efficiencies are those deriving from the elimination of double markups -theory shows that most vertical restraints have competitive effects that are ambiguous theoretically, and whose sign and magnitude are extremely sensitive to the presence of conditions and circumstances that are difficult to verify in practice.
• Empirical analyses of vertical integration and control have failed to find compelling evidence that these practices have harmed competition, and numerous studies find otherwise. Some studies find evidence consistent with both pro-and anticompetitive effects; but virtually no studies can claim to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition.
In an antitrust case involving a vertical restraint, the authority must decide whether to challenge the practice based on the evidence. A useful decision rule will classifies evidence by the likelihood that it was generated by a procompetitive or anticompetitive practice. Two types of errors, and concomitant losses, will attend any decision rule: the loss from prosecuting a procompetitive practice (type-I error), 29 and the loss from failing to prosecute an anticompetitive practice (type-II error). Writing the losses associated with each type of error as I L and II L , the expected losses from type-I and type-II errors given the evidence x can be written as:
where P(∏) denotes probability, and the last term in each equality follows from Bayes'rule, as stated in (1). A Bayesian classification rule leads the enforcer to challenge a vertical practice based on the available evidence only if the expected type-II loss from letting it go is greater than the expected type-I loss of challenging it, or from rearranging (2) and (3):
It is easy to see from (4) that the optimal enforcement rule depends on the likelihoods, loss functions, and the prior beliefs. A decision to challenge a given restraint is more likely if:
(1) the cost of type-II errors is high relative to the cost of type-I errors; (2) there are strong priors that a practice is anticompetitive; and (3) theory suggests a strong likelihood that the evidence was generated by an anticompetitive rather than a procompetitive or benign practice. In this framework, likelihoods and priors may vary according to the type of restraint at issue and the pro and anticompetitive theories posited. For example, based on the empirical evidence reviewed in section III, our priors that RPM or exclusive dealing are procompetitive may be stronger than our priors for other forms of vertical control on which there has been little empirical work. Further, evidence of downstream foreclosure and economies of scale will affect the likelihood differently in the case of maximum RPM than in the case of exclusive dealing.
As a threshold matter, this classification scheme assumes that a decision maker can measure x accurately. In reality, this assumption may not hold. Whether the models discussed in section II give rise to an anticompetitive outcome depends on details of the competitive environment. For example, the welfare effects of RRC models depend on the values of cost and demand parameters. Similarly, the outcome of a strategic agency model depends on the nature of downstream competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot) and the observability of input contracts.
In practice, it may be difficult or impossible to determine these details.
Assuming the decision maker can measure x accurately, evidence will fall into one of space into two regions, where conduct that on net harms welfare is classified as A, and that which on net increases welfare or is neutral is classified as C, however, allows for ease of exposition.
three categories. First, some evidence may contradict the necessary conditions for anticompetitive effects under the relevant theory (i.e., ( ) 0 P x A = ). For instance, upstream market power is a necessary condition for anticompetitive effects in many models, and nonlinear pricing is often important for models of strategic agency or multilateral opportunism to apply. Thus, if highly competitive upstream markets are observed, a policy maker can rule out most theories of competitive harm. Similarly, if linear input contracts are observed, certain theories of multilateral opportunism or strategic agency can be ruled out. In this way, the presence of evidence contradicting necessary conditions for anticompetitive harm can be used to design safe harbors.
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The second type of evidence a decision maker may observe is that which is consistent with the necessary conditions for anticompetitive harm, but that is at least equally consistent with procompetitive theories, or ( ) ( ) P x A P x C ≤ . For example, upstream market power is necessary for theories of harm as well as efficiencies from elimination of double markups to obtain. Further, observing wholesale prices near marginal cost may diminish claims of efficiencies from eliminating the double mark-up, but this evidence does not rule out other efficiencies from vertical practices, like enhanced promotional incentives or the attenuation of hold-up problems.
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Finally, a policy maker may observe evidence that is associated only (or predominantly) with anticompetitive outcomes. In this case, ( ) ( ) P x A P x C > . Our review of theory, however, suggests that this may be a close to empty set. For example, in the case of tying or exclusive dealing, even large levels of downstream foreclosure and scale economies may not suggest a net anticompetitive effect, because such evidence does not rule out an inference that plausible efficiencies from these practices outweigh any competitive loss. 34 To the extent that theory cannot provide sufficient conditions for vertical restraints to have net harmful effects, a decision maker may observe only the first two types of evidence. If this is the case, ( ) 0 1 ( )
This has two important implications for antitrust enforcers. First, because the empirical literature suggests that ( ) ( ) P C P A > , if the likelihood is bounded from above by one, the posterior odds of a practice being anticompetitive are at most equal the prior odds. Thus, given strong priors that vertical restraints are efficient, enforcement against vertical restraints should be rare absent direct evidence of harm to welfare. Second, even assuming that ( ) 1 ( ) Likewise, more flexibility in U.S. markets and the legal doctrine of stare decisis (which counsels against the overturning of legal precedents except in extraordinary circumstances) rationally may lead U.S. authorities to be biased against type-I errors.
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V. Conclusion
The outcome-based approach to antitrust ushered in by Sylvania in the United States (and gaining momentum in the EU) requires enforcement officials to demonstrate likely adverse effects on welfare. We view this primarily as a problem of inference: given the evidence, what is the probability that a given practice is anticompetitive? One approach to the inference problem is to set up "screens" based on structural conditions like market share, where harm is presumed if the conditions are met. Unfortunately, the search for a screen that works well in all but a few well specified instances has proved elusive.
36
A second approach is one based on an economic model of the restraint; i.e., posit a theory under which the restraint in question can harm competition, against alternatives in which the restraint is benign or procompetitive, and then determine which theory best explains the available evidence. In this paper, we have argued that it is difficult to distinguish welfareenhancing from welfare-reducing vertical practices based on evidence because the theory of vertical control tells us only that anticompetitive effects are possible. Until theory can be used to determine how likely it is that a restraint will lead to an anticompetitive outcome, it does not give 35 The reluctance to overrule precedent, and the collective action problem associated with private incentives to challenge bad precedent, is likely to insulate the deterrent effect of a type-I error, while the market may be selfcorrecting with respect to type-II errors. As Easterbrook (1984, pp. 2-3) observes:
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practices faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly vices eventually attract entry.
See also McChesney (2003 McChesney ( , 1401 McChesney ( , 1412 ) ("The cost of Type II errors . . . will be low, as long as barriers to entering markets plagued by suspected anticompetition are also low. As prices rise because of anticompetitive contracts or practices, new entrants emerge to alleviate or even eradicate the problem.").
us a way to interpret evidence in most cases. 37 In this world, enforcement decisions should be guided by prior beliefs and loss functions. Our review of the empirical evidence -which informs our priors -suggests that vertical restraints are likely to be benign or welfare enhancing.
An aggressive enforcement policy, therefore, would have to be justified by relatively large type II error costs.
Given the current state of knowledge, we suggest that enforcement policy should be guided by a third approach: draw inferences about the competitive effects of the restraint from a natural experiment. The quality of the experiment and how closely it mimics the effect of the restraint would be issues for the court or decision maker to resolve. Collusion theories were potentially applicable to a most 15 percent of the cases in this sample. Virtually all of the cases were consistent with some version of the "special services" theory of minimum RPM (e.g., whereby RPM induces retailers to provide services at the point of sale, or take other actions to preserve the manufacturer's reputation for quality).
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Treating RPM as illegal per se deters use of RPM to solve principal-agent problems, does little to deter collusion.
Gilligan ( Analyzed the impact of the decision on the share prices of both manufacturers and dealers. Generally found that the decision generated minimal abnormal returns for most of the firms in his sample.
Results provide (weak) support for the dealer cartel theory (principally in one industry, consumer electronics) and the efficiency rationales for RPM. No support was found for the manufacturer cartel theory Slade (1998) beer Investigated the UK Merger and Monopolies Commission's decision to require large vertically integrated brewer/retailers to divest themselves of pubs and also to offer the beer of at least one rival brewer. Estimated reduced form retail price equations for "tied" and "free" pubs using panel specification.
Found that the implementation of the beer orders resulted in higher retail prices at vertically controlled retailers ("tied houses"), while prices at unintegrated retailers ("free houses") remained unchanged.
Divestiture policy did not accomplish its goal of reducing retail beer prices. Stations that switched from jobbersupply to direct refiner supply reduce their prices by 0.6¢-1.0¢ per gallon.
Open supply legislation would not result in lower retail prices. Barron & Umbeck (1984 & 1985 gasoline Compared pre-and postdivorcement (vertical separation) pricing behavior of gasoline stations in Maryland.
At stations that had been companyowned before the enactment of the legislation, fullservice rices rose 6.7¢ (relative to competitors); self-service prices rose 1.4¢. They also found that prices at competing stations also rose post-divorcement.
Requiring vertical separation between refiners and retailers results in higher retail prices. Integration was at worst neutral from consumers' perspectives, and quite possibly beneficial. Any harm to consumers from the exclusion of nonintegrated programming services was more than outweighed by the overall superior product-price mix offered by integrated systems. Overall, consumers in unintegrated cable markets received $1.58 of consumer surplus; consumers in markets where the system was integrated into basic cable received $1.96; and consumers in areas where the system owned premium programming services received $2.00 of surplus.
Vertical integration generally beneficial to consumers of cable TV services. Vita (1997) cable TV Analyzed the incentives of cable systems to exclude local broadcasters from their programming lineup. Paper estimated logit equations for whether or not a local broadcaster was carried on a local cable system.
Used "natural experiment" to assess carriage choices after "must carry" regulations struck down by courts. Theory predicted systems would exclude local competing broadcasters, and keep less competitive distant broadcasters. However, results showed that cable systems tended to drop the more distant network station. Generally, dropped stations had low ratings and originated in a different geographic market from the system.
Cable TV carriage decisions with respect to local broadcasters motivated by efficiency considerations. Waterman & Weiss (1996) cable TV Estimated reduced form "carriage" equations (e.g., which pay networks were carried). Dummy variables for vertical integration with particular pay cable networks.
Cable systems that owned pay movie channels (e.g., HBO) were less likely to carry rival pay channels (e.g., Showtime).
Findings consistent both with foreclosure explanations for vertical integration as well as with efficiency explanations.
Article Product Method & Data Finding Conclusion Rosengren & Meehan (1994) various Stock market event study of the impact of (1) Stock market event study showing that the customers of USS enjoyed positive abnormal returns (1%) upon announcement of the transaction) suggesting that the effect of the lease was to increase steel output.
Transaction likely motivated by efficiency considerations (specifically, to induce both USS and Great Northern to make relationship-specific investments).
Article Product Method & Data Finding Conclusion Lopatka & Godek (1992) aluminum Assesses the claims that Alcoa maintained its monopoly in aluminum ingot production by raising the costs of potential entrants through "overbuying" supplies of two inputs critical to aluminum production: electricity and bauxite
Demonstrate that foreclosure theory is empirically implausible. Alcoa never controlled more than a minuscule fraction (at most, approximately 5 percent) of the market for electric power. Second, Alcoa's acquisition of bauxite ore accounted for only a fraction of available supplies, and moreover was consistent with its own input demand levels (i.e., there was no credible evidence of the Alcoa "overbought" bauxite ore).
"Raising rivals' costs" theory of harm from Aloca's input procurement policies empirically implausible. Graddy (1997) fast food Cross-sectional reduced form price regression with dummy variable indicating whether store is company-owned or franchise.
The price of a meal at a companyowned store is approximately 2.8% lower than the same meal at a franchised store.
Evidence supports theory that prices will be higher when franchises have local market power.
